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- 43a Brooks v. Valley National Bank (Sup.Ct. of Ariz.,
April, 1976), 548 P.2d 1166 ("Brooks II"), supersedes the
opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals in Brooks v. Valley
National Bank, 539 P.2d 958 (1975) ("Brooks I"), cited at
page 31 of respondent's brief.

Brooks II sustained the

Superior Court's granting of motion to dismiss the action,
as did Brooks I, holding:

(a) a trust was not created for

the impounded funds even though the words "in trust" were
used in the mortgage documents, and (b) the bank was not
unjustly enriched through use of the funds.

The reasoning

follows the opinion in Brooks I cited in respondent's brief.
The concurring opinion in Brooks II reasoned that a trust
was created because the bank received the funds to be applied
to a particular purpose but, nevertheless, the dismissal of
the complaint was still proper, saying:
Brooks relies on the general rule of law
that it is the duty of a trustee to protect the interests of the beneficiary of
a trust by the exercise of reasonable
care and diligence in the management of
the trust property, Bulla v. Valley National Bank of Phoenix, 82 Ariz. 84, 308
P.2d 932 (1957), and the general rule that
that trustee has a duty to invest the
trust property so that it is made productive for the beneficiary. Restatement
(Second) of Trusts, §181 (1959). Where,
however, a rule of law might otherwise
be applicable to an agreement, custom or
usage may make such rule of law inapplicable. Williston, Law of Contracts,
§648 (3rd ed. 1961).

- 43b The practice of requiring impound
payments has existed since the early
1930 f s. In every instance, without exception, where a suit has been brought
to compel payment of interest or the
earnings on the investment of the impound
funds, the lending institution has not
paid the mortgagor for the use of the impound funds. Nor is there anywhere the
slightest suggestion that the Valley National Bank or any lending institution
ever paid for the use of impound funds.
While a few isolated instances will
not prove a usage, one so firmly established for so many years nationwide should
be controlling. A usage will be binding if
it is uniform, long established, and so
well known that it can be said that the
parties contracted with reference to it
and the failure to conform to it would be
the exception. Cleveland etc. R.R. Co. v.
Jenkins, 174 111 398, 51 N.E. 811. Nor
is a usage invalid because its effect is
different from a general rule of law.
It is well settled that a trade
usage which is contrary to a statute
or which contravenes public policy is
invalid and may not be invoked; but
where a rule of law is of a character
that the parties may make it inapplicable to their contract by express
agreement, they may likewise render
it inapplicable by implied usage or
by usage." Wolfe v. Texas Co., 83
F.2d 425, 431 (10th Cir. 1936).
I am therefore of the opinion that by
banking usage neither interest nor earnings
on investment was expected to be credited
to the mortgagor.
A not-yet-reported decision is Throp v. Bell
Federal Savings & Loan A s s o c , Ill.App.Ct., Docket No.
60252, decided July 26, 1976, aff'd on rehearing, 10-7-76.

- 43c It affirmed granting of defendant's motion to dismiss of
plaintiff's claim for earnings on the escrow funds, saying
"the use or non-use of the words

f

in trust1 is not the

controlling criteria as to whether an express trust has or
has not been created."

It is the most recent decision on

the subject and contains a review of recent authorities
similar to other cases cited in respondent's brief.

Its

reasoning is applicable to appellants' simplistic argument
as to use of the word "pledge" in the mortgage document.
Finally, we cite the Report of Committee on Real
Estate Financing entitled "Class Actions Under Antitrust
Laws on Account of Escrow and Similar Practices," Real
Property Probate and Trust Journal of the American Bar
Association Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law,
Volume 11, No. 2, Summer, 1976.

It concludes:

If lenders begin to pay interest on
escrow accounts, realistically the additional expenses that result will in some
manner be borne by borrowers either by
a carrying charge or increase in the loan
rates which would cover these expenses.
In short the payment of interest on escrow
accounts would not result in any economic
benefit to borrowers and would in all probability increase costs at least on smaller
loans.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY A.
MADSEN, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Case No. L4530

vs.
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a contract action.

Plaintiffs, as bor-

rowers, executed a trust deed to defendant lender in a
typical residental mortgage transaction.

As required by the

trust deed, for 11 years plaintiffs paid defendant monthly
payments of principal and interest, and a "budget payment"
of 1/12 of estimated annual real property taxes and insurance premiums, without expectation of receiving any compensation on the budget payments.

Although the contract is

silent on the subject, plaintiffs now complain that defendant should pay plaintiffs the net earnings on such budget
payments on a theory of unjust enrichment.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, denied plaintiffs1 motion for partial summary judgment as to liability

- 2 and granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, no cause of action (R.479-80).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant prays the judgment be affinned, and that
it be awarded its costs on appeal.
FACTS
The facts are not in dispute.

Only a few addi-

tions are necessary to plaintiffs1 Statement of Facts.
On September 21, 1964, plaintiffs, as borrowers,
executed to defendant a trust deed (R.2).

By paragraph 4

of the trust deed (R.5), plaintiffs promised to pay and have
paid defendant, for 11 years, not only monthly payments of
principal and interest, but also a monthly payment of 1/12
of estimated annual real property taxes and insurance premiums on the mortgaged property, referred to variously in
the cases as "budget payments," "reserves,"1 "impounds" or
"escrows".
The interest rate on plaintiffs' loan, still
unpaid, is 6-1/2 percent per annum.
The complaint sought to require defendant to pay
interest or earnings on the reserves, although no provision
is made for such under the contract.
two theories:

The complaint claimed

(1) breach of contract, or (2) unjust enrich-

ment.
Plaintiffs' complaint, paragraphs 13 through 16
(R.3) alleges the trust deed includes an "implied term" that

- 3 defendant will pay reasonable interest on mbnies paid to it
for payment of taxes and insurance, that defendant has
breached the contract by not paying any interest to plaintiffs, and that defendant is liable for such unpaid interest.

The claim for interest apparently has been abandoned

on appeal (appellants1 brief, p.l).
Paragraphs 17 through 21 of the complaint (R.3-4)
set forth alternative allegations of unjust enrichment to
the effect that defendant has earned a substantial profit
from the use of the reserve fund "belonging to plaintiffs,"
thereby becoming unjustly enriched, and praying for restitution of the earnings represented by such unjust enrichment.

That apparently is the only claim urged on appeal

(appellants1 brief, pp.l# 17-18).
The pertinent portions of the contract, the trust
deed (R.5, 58-59), are paragraphs 2 and 4 (R.5).

It is

accurately quoted on pages 2 and 3 of plaintiffs' brief.
Plaintiffs testified on deposition that:
(1)

When plaintiffs executed the trust deed they

knew the trust deed required them to pay the monthly
budget payments (depo., pp.9-10, 26). j
(2)

Plaintiffs, at execution, knew defendant

would not pay plaintiffs interest or earnings on the
budget payments (depo., p.26).

Plaintiffs thought that

unfair at the time (depo., p.47), but had no discussion
with defendant's personnel as to the required budget

- 4 payments or as to payment of interest or earnings
thereon (depo., p.10).
(3)

Since 1964, plaintiffs have paid all such

budget payments each month without expectation that
defendant would pay interest or earnings on such reserves (depo., p.26), and plaintiffs have never asked
for payment of earnings or that budget payments not be
commingled (depo., pp.23, 25).
Defendant's affidavit states why, for 20 years,
its policy has been to require the reserve payments and why
it has not paid interest or earnings on them (R.282-4).
Plaintiffs admit (plaintiff's brief, p. 3) that
the requirement of collection of monthly budget payments is
standard or required procedure for lenders, as evidenced by
the Federal regulations and state statutes quoted in their
brief, pp. 3-5,
A new regulation was promulgated by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board on June 16, 1975 to prescribe the
circumstances under which federal savings and loan associations, such as defendant, may pay interest on escrows.
provides (12C.F.R., §545.6-11(c)):
A Federal association which makes a loan
on or after June 16, 1975, on the security
of a single-family dwelling occupied or to
be occupied by the borrower (except such a
loan for which a bona fide commitment was
made before that date) shall pay interest

It

- 5 on any escrow account maintained in connection with such a loan (1) if there is in
effect a specific statutory provision or
provisions of the State in which such dwelling is located by or under the State-chartered
savings and loan associations, mutual savings
banks and similar institutions are generally
required to pay interest on such escrow accounts F and (2) at not less than the rate
required to be paid by such State-chartered
institutions but not to exceed the rate being
paid by the Federal association in its regular accounts (as defined in Section 526.1 of
this chapter). Except as provided by contract , a Federal association shall have no
obligation to pay interest on escrow accounts
apart from the duties imposed by this paragraph. (Emphasis added.)
Utah statutes are silent as to any requirement that interest
be paid on escrows; indeed the silence in the authorization
statutes (§§7-7-5(e) (3) and 7-12-47 (1) (2), U.C.A. 1953), is
deafening.
Plaintiffs1 reserve account for 1974 (Exhibit A
attached to plaintiff Madsens" deposition) shows an average
monthly balance of $275.47 (by adding monthly balances and
dividing by 12), on which the gross earnings atf say, five
percent per annum, would be $13.77 for the year before
considering defendant's cost of handling the account and
producing the earnings.

Defendant estimated the cost would

be more than $16 per account per year (R.287).
On this record, the lower court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs'
motion for partial summary judgment on liability (R.479-80).
Plaintiffs filed timely appeal.

- 6-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS MITIGATE AGAINST
PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIM
Plaintiffs' claim is controlled by the contract
between the parties.

Nevertheless, actions of this type

have become very popular lately, as will be seen by the
number of cases recently filed in other jurisdictions, all
unsuccessful.

The reason for the popularity is set forth in

appellants1 brief, pp.21-2:
The concept of setting aside a prorata
share of annual tax and insurance costs each
month in a separate account arises from the
experience of lenders during the depression
of the 1930's, when many people lost their
homes in tax foreclosures. In order to make
mortgage loans more attractive to lenders,
the Federal Housing Administration made
escrow accounts mandatory on all FHA-insured
mortgage loans. At that time, interest rates
paid on savings accounts were so low — around
1 or 2 percent — that no thought was given to
payment of interest on escrow accounts. In
fact, some lenders charged an extra fee for
handling the accounts. Over the years, the
prepayment of tax and insurance payments into
escrow accounts that bear no interest became
established practice within the lending industry, not only for government-insured loans,
but for conventional mortgage loans as well.;
But times have changed. Passbook interest rates are no longer at 1 percent. The
amount of money held in savings accounts is
at an all-time high and the problem of tax
foreclosures today is nowhere near what it
was in the 1930's. As for the escrow funds
lenders hold, it has become an accepted practice for many lenders to commingle these funds

- 7 with other money invested for profit. Thus,
the lenders have become accustomed to substantial income from the investment of mortgage borrowers' escrow funds, and seldom do
they share those earnings with the people
who own the money.
There are no national figures to show
how much mortgage lenders earn from the
interest-free use of escrow money, but a study
by Prof. John A. Spanogle, Jr., of the University of Main School of Law, estimates it
at $100 million a year. "Homeowners vs.
Lenders — A Question of Interest," 38 Consumer Report 202 (1973).
Plaintiffs' claim is of great significance to the
entire mortgage lending industry and the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, which regulates all national savings and loan
associations, including defendant.

The claim also affects

routine real estate contracts, where often it is expressed
that the buyer's monthly payments include a reserve for
taxes and insurance.
The claim of plaintiffs, if successful, would
adversely affect the marketability of mortgages in the
secondary market. Mortgages are sold like commodities,
sometimes outright and sometimes with the seller remaining
obligated to the buyer to service the loan.
In defendant's case, in August, 1975, 20,383
mortgages were on the books, of which (a) 3,749 had been
sold, including reserves, to 17 different investors, including governmental investors such as Federal National
Mortgage Association, Government National Mortgage Association, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporaton and Utah State

- 8 Retirement Fund; (b) 4,301 participation interests had been
sold; and (c) 603 were purchased from other original mortgagees.

About 100 mortgages are sold outright each year and

are no longer on defendant's books (R.74).
The Intermountain area is and traditionally has
been "savings poor," that is, the public does not make
sufficient time or savings deposits to sustain the growing
demand for mortgage money for new residential and commercial
buildings.

As a result, defendant and other lenders in this

area depend upon the secondary market where they, from time
to time, and not necessarily when a particular mortgage is
closed, sell mortgages either outright or with participation
interests to obtain necessary cash for mortgage demands.
Thus, in August, 1975, defendant had sold interests in
varying amounts up to 100 percent of 8,050 of the loans it
was then servicing, or approximately 40 percent.

The per-

centage varies from time to time depending upon savings
deposits and demand for mortgage money, but the ability of
lenders in our area to sell part of their portfolio is very
important to sustaining the economy.

Loans are sold, in

whole or in part, to various priviate agencies as well as to
federal agencies.

FHA Regulations (§203.19, C.F.R. 1971)

require tax and insurance reserves in all FHA mortgages, as
do Federal Regulations for all savings and loan associations
on loans over 80 percent of the value of the property

» 9(§545.6-l(a) (4) (iii), C.F.R. 1972).

These types of loans

average over 30 percent of defendant's volume.

The policy

of governmental or quasi-governmental agencies in the secondary market, such as Government National Mortgage Association, Federal National Mortgage Association and Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, is and has been for many,
many years to require that provision for tax and insurance
reserves be in the mortgages they purchase as additional
security on the mortgage, and as a result, the entire secondary market of private investors so requires.

This re-

quirement is imposed because these loans are relatively high
in ratio of loan to property value, so that without the
reserve, there would be risk of loss of the security through
tax sale to collect the prior tax lien or through uninsured
casualty loss.

Hence, it is absolutely necessary for lenders

in this area, in order to sustain their ability to meet
demand for additional mortgage funds as required by the
Intermountain economy, to have the great bulk of their
portfolio of mortgages in such form as the governmental
agencies in the secondary market require.

In 1954, Federal

National Mortgage Association, the only governmental agency
then in the secondary market, required the reserves to be
separately held in trust in a non-interest bearing checking
account and separately accounted for.

As a result, in the

past 20 years, all of defendant's residential mortgages made

- 10 with the expectation of potential sale of the mortgage to
the secondary market, have required the borrower to pay a
monthly reserve payment for future taxes and insurance.
Virtually all lending institutions have similar requirements
for the same reasons.

(Defendant has made a limited number

of mortgage loans, called "MIL" loans, for such things as
home improvements, which it does not intend ever to sell to
secondary markets, at substantially higher interest rates.
They are not the typical residential first mortgage loans of
the type herein involved.

It has not in the past required

reserve payments on the MIL loans.

The MIL loans are not

included in the statistical information herein.) Traditionally, no interest or earnings on such reserves have been
paid by defendant or other savings and loan associations or
financial institutions.

Lenders must certify annually to

all investors on loans they service that property taxes have
been paid.

If lenders were required to pay interest or

earnings on these tax reserves, they would have no ability
to collect those items on loans sold to others because loans
are sold in the secondary market on the basis of a fixed,
net yield to the investor after servicing expenses. Further, the ability of lenders in Utah to deal in the secondary market would be greatly jeopardized, for there is the
risk that the secondary market simply would deal with the
Utah mortgage lenders on more burdensome terms, and that

- 11 would very seriously hurt the Utah economy.

Utah lenders

certainly would have to increase initial service charge fees
or interest rates to compensate for the difference they
would be required to pay on reserve accounts (R.281-3).
If mortgagors were entitled to interest or earnings on the reserves, who would pay it, the original mortgagee or the buyer of the mortgage?

What law would set the

ratef the place where the mortgage was made or where the
holder resides?

How could earnings be measured?

be earnings of the mortgagee or the holder?
some percentage of his gross earnings?

Would it

Would it be

What if the mort-

gagee has earnings from various types of businesses?

Even

if separate investment were required for reserve funds only,
lenders could only invest these reserve funds in short-term
obligations which permit prompt liquidation at tax time.
Would separate trust investments of reserve funds have to be
made for each mortgagor?

Could the reserve funds be in-

vested for all mortgagors as a class?

Is it gross interest

or earnings that must be paid, or is the gross to be offset
by the cost of making the investments, of receiving and
accounting for the budget payments, auditing, cost of ascertainment of the correct amount of taxes and insurance premiums to pay and payment thereof, errors and omissions
insurance, and the cost of reporting to mortgagors?

If it

is net earnings, how are the expenses to be apportioned

-••12

-

among the lender's other expenses? The expense of handling
each account would be fairly uniform, but some reserve
accounts would be small so that there would be a net loss on
the small accounts; if net earnings were to be paid on the
larger reserve accounts, must the small reserve accounts
repay the net loss on them?

The contract document at bar

settles none of these problems.

To become entangled in

these problems, and they are myriad, is to simply destroy
the negotiability of existing mortgage portfolios, for no
one would or could buy them if to do so would involve problems of this type.

One of the main purposes of federal

regulation of federal savings and loan associations is to
protect the federal agency in its acquisition of mortgages
and related notes from the federal savings and loan associations.

Thus, great deference should be given to the federal

regulations and the cases which interpret them in determining whether plaintiffs have a claim against defendant.
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965).

Those regula-

tions all imply that plaintiffs1 claim is unfounded.
Although the secondary mortgage market now requires that reserves be paid on mortgages to be purchased,
consider that if mortgagees were required to pay interest or
earnings on the reserves, they would either raise interest
rates to compensate or, more likely, would cease collecting
the re-serves in instances where they were not absolutely

- 13 required by law to collect such reserves.

If the latter

occurred, county governments would be greatly affected, for
they would no longer receive a few large checks from the
lending institutions on the exact day taxes are due on the
many properties involved*

That would increase the county's

cost of receiving individual payments from the mortgagors,
would impair the dependability of payments on a day certain
and would increase tax delinquencies.
Consider that a mortgagee is entitled to have his
security protected.

He is entitled to require by contract

that the borrower not waste the mortgaged premises, and that
waste will be an act of default.

The risk that the security

will be lost or impaired through non-payment of the priority
lien of property taxes or through casualty destruction is a
real risk.

A mortgagee is entitled to require by contract

that borrowers pay property taxes and insurance premiums
before they become delinquent to protect against those
risks.

He is entitled to require by contract that borrowers

post an advance fund for payment of the taxes and insurance
premiums so that the lender will have funds on hand to pay
the taxes and insurance premiums as they become due. They
are entitled to require such advance payments by contract,
just as much as they are entitled to require a bargained-for
monthly repayment of the loan and a bargained-for interest
rate.

Indeed, §75-5-5(a)(3), U.C.A., gives specific author-

ity for such in providing:

- 14 The association may require that the
equivalent of . . . estimated taxes, insurance premiums and other charges . . . be
paid each month in advance to the association in addition to interest and principal
payments . . . .
The amount of the loan, the terms of repayment and the
interest rate are matters of bargaining between the parties,
and these are affected by, among other things, the borrower's
promise to pay in advance to the lender the reserve for
taxes and insurance premiums.
about such a bargain.

There is nothing "unfair"

"No doubt the contracts . . . were

"adhesion1 contracts, but we are not prepared to hold
that they were unconscionable . . .," Carpenter v. Suffolk
Franklin Savings Bank (Mass. 1976), 346 N.E.2d 892. Now,
considering that the parties have made their bargain as expressed in the contract, including the rate of interest the
borrower will pay the lender on the loan and the requirement of budget payments for taxes and insurance premiums, as
well as all other terms, if the parties intended the lender
to pay the borrower interest or earnings on the reserve
payments, which could very well affect the interest rate or
other terms,, would that not be expressed in the agreement?
How can a mortgagor expect a court to change just that one
part of the entire bargain?
Finally, just because interest rates have increased is no reason to change the bargain of the parties to
say that the contract today requires interest or earnings be

- 15 paid on reserves when the contract did not so require when
interest rates were lower; plaintiffs1 interest rate on the
principal sum does not increase as general interest rates
increase, and neither should the contract change as to the
reserve provision.

No lender would have been heard to sayf

in days when it cost more to handle the budget payments and
keep track of the taxes and insurance premiums than he could
earn on the reserves, that although there was no provision
in his contract for such, he should be compensated for his
loss; just because times have changed does not now permit
borrowers to change the contract or claim that the contract
is now unfair.
Have in mind that it undeniably benefits mortgagors, to some degree, to have mortgagees do the accounting
work to enable a mortgagor to budget in advance for his tax
and insurance bills, thereby relieving the mortgagor of the
worry about not having funds to pay -chose large amounts when
they become due, with attendant worry of the risk of uninsured destruction of his property or incurring added penalty
for non-payment of taxes.

Have in mind the de minimus

effect on each particular mortgage.
Hence, it is clearly shown that this is not a
situation
[I]nvolving an unscrupulous loan shark
attempting to hide the effective rate of
a loan throuah deceotive rate disclosures.

- 16 There is no ethical impropriety accompanying
the practice which Plaintiffs are attempting
to discredit, and this is illustrated by
the fact that the United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development requires
maintenance of such escrow accounts for
FHA insured mortgages.
Moreover, there is a strong public
policy which favors the practice of collecting in advance real estate taxes and
insurance premiums. It extends to the
borrower a useful and desirable service,
much in the same manner that the Federal
and state governments "withhold" taxes to
insure that funds are available when the
taxes become due. Defendants should not
necessarily be expected to perform this
service gratis. Graybeal v. American Sav.
& Loan Ass'n., 59 F.R.D. 7, 20 (D.D.C.
1973). Footnote omitted; emphasis in
original.)
Rather, the present case challenges established commercial
practice that has been at least tacitly approved by both
Federal and state regulatory authorities for over 20 years
and which has not been overturned by the legislature of this
state despite ample opportunities to do so.

Indeed, the

statutes of Utah specifically permit the precise practice of
which plaintiffs complain.

All of this hardly adds up to

compelling public policy that warrants the type of judicial
legislation or reformation of contract that plaintiffs cry
for.
There are plenty of policy reasons why federal
savings and loan associations, so heavily regulated on a
federal basis, should not be required to pay interest or

- 17 earnings on the reserve accounts on mortgages they make in
the future.

Whatever view one may take as to "fairness," it

is clear that the F.H.L.B.B. has left, and the courts should
leave, this decision to the legislatures of the various
states.

The Court should do likewise in view of the new

federal regulation (12 C.F.R., §545.6-11(c)), stating when
interest may be paid on these escrows.

The legislature can

act in futuro, balancing on one hand the problem that legislation requiring compensation on reserves will put the
lenders in the state at a competitive disadvantage, since
they must either charge higher rates to compensate or eliminate the reserve requirements and, thus, have less secure
loans to sell in the national secondary market.

Against this

must be balanced any conceived social good arising from the
legislation.

But this is a legislative problem, not a legal

problem, capable of ex post facto determination by courts
which must construe existing contracts, not future policy.
Having all this in mind, it is incredible to think
the parties intended an implied promise in their contract
that interest or earnings would be due on these budget
payments.
contract.

That brings us to interpretation of plaintiffs1

- 18 POINT II
BORROWERS DO NOT OWN OR RETAIN ANY INTEREST
IN THE RESERVE FUNDS
The monthly budget payments made by plaintiff to
defendant, which are "estimated to equal" annual taxes and
insurance premiums are exclusively the property of defendant
under the contract.

The borrowers pay monthly payments of

principal, interest and budget payments.
payment into a specific reserve fund.

They make no

Under the contract

defendant "may" use the budget portion to pay taxes and
insurance premiums, may apply the funds to the note, or may
hold the funds as additional security.

Defendant is not

required to apply them to pay taxes or insurance premiums or
to any special purpose, as appellants1 brief suggests.
Plaintiffs do not own the funds or any res.

In

First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Lincoln v.
The Board of Equalization of Lancaster County, 152 N.W.2d 8
(Neb. 1967), plaintiff lender challenged governmental taxation of the reserves, claiming it did not own the funds.
The Court held that the funds belong to the lender:
The borrower's only right is to require that each payment be applied in accordance with the terms of the contract. The
plaintiffs are not required to keep the advance payment funds separate, but are permitted to commingle and invest them and keep
the earnings . . . .
. . .[T]he advance payments for insurance and
taxes, when made, become the property of
the plaintiffs the same as any other payment required of the borrower . . . .

- 19 Similarly, in bankruptcy proceedings, the budget
payments are not the property of the debtor-mortgagor nor
property which vests in the bankruptcy trustee of a bankrupt
mortgagor, but rather belong to the lender; In re Simon, 167
F.Supp. 214 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).

Likewise, such payments are

not subject to proceedings to enforce the rights of judgment
creditors of the mortgagor; Central Suffolk Hospital Association v. Downs, 213 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1961), and Valerio v. College
Point Savings Bank, 48 Misc.2d 91, 264 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1965).
A few comments as to non-liability for interest on
the reserves are appropriate.

Since such payments belong

exclusively to the lender, no implied covenant to pay interest is created, nor is the lender unjustly enriched if the
payments are invested and a profit made thereon.
tion is not unique.

The situa-

Lessees frequently pay lessors rent in

advance for the last month's rent under a lease, or tenants
post advance security for cleanup at the end of tenancy, or
persons post cash bonds or deposit money in checking accounts.
Those situations do not typically require payment of interest or earnings on the funds paid, and the payee is entitled
to commingle the funds with his own.
As a matter of general principle, 47 C.J.S.,
Interest, §12, page 23, says in total:
In the absence of an agreement or
custom to pay interest on money received
for the use of another, one who has so

- 20 received money to hold and pay over to
the proper person generally is not chargeable with interest unless he is guilty of
bad faith or unreasonable delay.
One who has received money for the
use of another, but is charged merely with
the duty of holding the money and paying it
over to the proper person, generally is not
chargeable with interest unless he is guilty
of bad faith or unreasonable delay in dealing with it, or unless there is an agreement to pay interest or a custom to pay
interest on money so received. Where money
in a person's possession is retained in good
faith and without fraud or misconduct on his
part, he will not be chargeable with interest for such detention.
Interest is allowable only (1) pursuant to contract, (2) for damages for wrongful detention of money, or
(3) when provided by statute; 47 C.J.S., Interest, §3, page
13.

No statute is here applicable.

Here defendant came

into possession of the funds rightfully pursuant to the
contract, and no claim is made that it is wrongfully detaining the funds.

Where a contract for a loan of money

does not provide for interest, interest may be charged only
after default in payment of the principal; Pack v. Dunn, 84
Utah 597, 37 P.2d 790.

Defendant is not in default in

payment thereof because defendant is entitled to hold the
funds pursuant to the contract.
In all the reported cases dealing with the specific situation at bar, the courts have uniformly rejected
summarily any claim for interest on the reserve funds.

- 21 Indeed, in Yudkin v. Avery Savings (Ken. 1974), 507 S.W.2d
689, the Court noted that these reserve or escrow fund cases
had recently been reaching the courts with considerable
frequency, and "in none of the reported cases was there
found to be any obligation of the lending institution to pay
interest on the escrowed money."
POINT III
UNDER NO THEORY IS DEFENDANT LIABLE FOR EARNINGS
ON THE RESERVE; DEFENDANT HAS NOT BEEN
UNJUSTLY ENRICHED
This case is controlled by §107(1) of the Restatements of Restitution, which provides:
(1) A person of full capacity who,
pursuant to a contract with another, has
performed services or transferred property
to the other or otherwise has conferred a
benefit upon him, is not entitled to compensation therefor other than in accordance
with the terms of such bargain, unless the
transaction is rescinded for fraud, mistake,
duress, undue influence or illegality, or
unless the other has failed to perform his
part of the bargain.
None of the exceptions apply here; plaintiffs do not claim
the loan transaction should be rescinded.

The terms of the

bargain do not provide for any compensation as claimed by
plaintiffs.
As stated in Baugh v. Parley, 184 P.2d 335 (Utah,
1947) at 337:
Unjust enrichment of a person occurs
when he has and retains money or benefits
which in justice and equity belong to another.

- 22 . . . The mere fact that a person benefits
another is not of itself sufficient to require
the other to make restitution therefor. Restatement of Restitution, §1, Comment C.
Schott v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Pa.
1969), 259 A.2d 443, held:
The quasi-contractual doctrine of unjust enrichment is inapplicable when the
relationship between the parties is founded
on a written agreement of express contract.
Any interpretation of the deed of trust must begin
with the document itself.

The accounting for earnings on

the fund is of such importance, and the manner of performing
is so complex and variable, that had the parties so intended,
appropriate provisions would have been included in the document.

The absence of such a provision indicates the lack of

such a requirement.

No "implied term" as claimed by plain-

tiffs can be discerned from the deed of trust, nor from the
action of the parties; indeed, the action of the parties is
entirely to the contrary.
Plaintiffs have not cited a single case where a
borrower recovered earnings on the reserve funds. Our
research has not disclosed any such cases.
The great majority of courts have expressly held,
on either motion to dismiss the complaint or on summary
judgment, that the lender, as a matter of law, has no obligation to pay interest or earnings on the reserve funds;
Zelickman v. Bell Federal Savings (111. 1973), 301 N.E.2d

- 23 47; Sears v. Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 275 N.E.2d 300
(111. 1971); Brooks v. Valley National Bank (Ariz. 1975),
539 P. 2d 958? Surrey Strathitiore Corp. v. Dollar Savings Bank
of New York (C.A.N.Y. 1975), 36 N.Y.2d 173, 325 N.E.2d 527;
Gibson v. First Federal of Detroit, (C.A.6th 1974), 504 F.2d
826; Richman v. Security Savings & Loan Assn. (Wise. 1973),
204 N.W.2d 511; Durkee v. Franklin Sav. Assn. (111. 1974),
309 N.E. 2d 118; Umdenstock v. Am. Mortgage & Investment Co.
(D.C. Okla. 1973), 363 F.Supp. 1375; Manchester Gardens, Inc.
v. Great West Life Assurance Co. (C.A.D.C. 1953), 205 F.2d
872; Stavrides v. Maryland National Bank (W.D.Pa. 1973), 353
F.Supp. 1972; Stavrides v. Mellon National Bank (1973), 487
F.2d 953; Yudkin v. Avery Savings (Ken. 1974), 507 S.W.2d
689; Anno. 50 A.L.R.3d 697. Other cases where borrowers
have been unsuccessful on such theories as

breach of con-

tract, breach of trust, unjust enrichment, fraud, truth-inlending, antitrust, pledgor-pledgee or agency, include:
Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 365
F.Supp. 975 (E.D.Pa. 1973); Tierney v. Whitestone Sav. &
Loan Assn., 83 Misc.2d 855, 373 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1975); Tucker
v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. (Ark. 1972), 381 S.W.2d
725; Cale v. American Nat'l Bank (1973), 370.Ohio Misc. 56;
Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Sav. Bank (Mass. 1976), 346
N.E.2d 892.

- 24 This is an impressive body of law.

All the courts

have reasoned that whether a trust was intended depends upon
the intent of the parties, as manifested by the contract.
Most have held, even though in the contract there was no
expression one way or another as to interest or earnings on
the reserve, that the contract was unambiguous and did not
permit recovery.
The courts have followed the language of the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §12, Comment 1 (1959):
Where the deposit is in escrow,
that is where the money is to be paid to
a third person on the happening of a
designated event and in the meantime the
depositor has no right to withdraw the money,
it depends upon the manifestation of the
intention of the parties whether the bank
may use as its own the money deposited
or whether the money shall be held in
trust. Such a deposit ordinarily indicates an intention that the bank may use
the money as its own . . . .
Zelickman, supra, is factually indistinguishable
from this case.

There the mortgage required the borrower:

(3) To pay when due all taxes and
assessments levied against said property
or any part thereof under any existing or
future law, and to deliver receipts for
such payments to the Mortgagee promptly
upon demand.

(9) To provide for payments of taxes,
assessments and insurance premiums, stipulated to be paid hereunder, the Mortgagor
shall deposit with the Mortgagee on each
monthly payment date an amount equal to

- 25 one-twelfth of the annual taxes ana assessments levied against said premises and onetwelfth of the annual premium on all such
insurance, as estimated by the Mortgagee.
All such deposits as made are pledged as
additional security for the payment of the
principal mortgage indebtedness. If default
is made in the payment of said deposits, the
Mortgagee may, at its option, charge the same
to the unpaid balance of the mortgage indebtedness and the same shall bear interest at the
same rate as the principal mortgage indebtedness. As taxes and assessments become due and
payable and as insurance policies expire, or
premiums thereon become due, the Mortgagee is
authorized to use such deposits for the purpose
of paying taxes or assessments, or renewing
insurance policies or paying premiums thereon.
In the event any deficit shall exist or the
deposits are so reduced that the remaining
deposits together with the monthly deposits
will not provide sufficient funds to pay
the then current calander [sic] year's estimated taxes or the estimated insurance premium on the last day of said year, the Mortgagee may, at its option, either declare immediately due and payable or add to the unpaid
balance of the mortgage indebtedness secured
hereby such a sum which shallr together with
the remaining deposits and monthly deposits,
provide sufficient funds to pay one year's
estimated taxes or insurance premiums on the
last day of said year. (Emphasis added.)
That language is. virtually identical to the language in the
case at bar.

The Court there said, in sustaining summary

judgment for the lender:
Counsel for plaintiffs . . . urge that
deposits made each month by plaintiffs of
sums for payment of taxes and insurance
premiums, are trust funds. They predicate
this contention primarily upon three key
words, "deposit," "pledged" and "authorized."
They urge that these deposits, being made
for specific and limited purposes, become

- 26 trust funds and that this conclusion is
fortified by the pledge of the deposits,
which also constitutes a trust, as well as
by use of the word "authorized."

The complaint alleged that these
monies paid to defendant by plaintiffs
as tax and insurance deposits were held
by defendant as a trustee or fiduciary
so that defendant owed a duty to segregate
the trust funds and to account to plaintiffs for earnings and profits resulting
therefrom.

In our opinion, no express trust can
be drawn from the language of the loan
application or of the mortgage or from
both of these documents combined. Plaintiffs covenanted to pay when due all taxes
and assessments and all insurance premiums.
Payment of these items thus became a primary obligation of plaintiffs with the
contractual right vested in defendant to
advance these items in default of payment by plaintiffs. Consequently, paragraph 9 of the mortgage above quoted should
necessarily be construed simply as another
security device granted expressly to defendant as mortgagee to assist it in making
certain that, when the taxes and insurance
premiums come due, funds will be available
for their prompt payment. In no sense can
the language of this instrument be construed
as creating an express trust for the benefit of plaintiffs. . . .
The Court noted that while the mortgage required "deposits"
"pledged" for taxes and insurance, it emphasized a number of
other important elements including the need to examine and
to give "meaning, life and effect" to all of the pertinent
language in the legal document in question.

It pointed out

- 27 the absence of language requiring that the tax and insurance
account be "segregated," "separated" or "isolated."

It

commented upon language authorizing authorizing defendant to
use the deposits for payment of taxes or insurance premiums.
It noted the pledge of the tax and insurance account as
further security for the indebtedness due and the lack of
provision for repayment of deposits.

It held that even if

the payments there were described as "deposits," no trust
would result.

It pointed out the complete lack of "a res or

specific property" which "is essential for the existence of
a trust."

It commented upon the lack of "a segregated

deposit set up solely for a specific purpose."

It cited and

quoted from other cases and from the regulations of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, all of which supported the
conclusion that there was no trust.

In holding that as a

matter of law plaintiffs could not recover under an implied
trust theory, it stated that "implied trusts may be further
categorized into constructive and resulting trust."

It held

there was no resulting trust which is generally defined and
limited to situations in which land or other property is
bought with the money of one person and title is taken in
the name of another.

It held a constructive trust arises

solely by operation of law only when fraud is proved or when
advantage is taken of a fiduciary relationship by the dominant party.

There were no allegations in the complaint

- 28 regarding fraud of any kind.

It held there is no fiduciary

or confidential relationship existing merely by virtue of
the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee.

Plaintiffs'

brief says Zelickman did not discuss plaintiffs' "pledge"
theory.

On the contrary, Zelickman specifically noted that

plaintiff's contention was predicated on the use of the key
word "pledged" and rejected it, citing Sears v. Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 275 N.E.2d 300 (Ill.App. 1971).
In Sears, the trial court granted defendant's
motion to dismiss the complaint.

In affirming, the appel-

late court gave several reasons for its decision that the
defendant was not obligated in law or equity, to account for
or distribute earnings to borrowers, including:
First, defendant was not required by the contract
to segregate or separate the payments from other accounts,
but was merely obligated by contract to pay the insurance
and taxes when due.

The absence of terms requiring segre-

gation or separation was held to show a lack of intent that
a special deposit was created.
Second, the Court held:
The monthly payments paid to defendant are not deposits in any legal sense
of that term, but they are simply payments
by a debtor upon amounts due the creditor.
Third, contrary to plaintiffs' contention here,
the Court held every pledge does not create a trust.
Court said:

The

- 29 We must expressly reject plaintiff's
argument that a trust is created because
of use of the word "pledge" in the note. . . .
This contention is a complete oversimplification and is based upon the most elementary
deductive reasoning. The syllogism is:
Every pledge is a trust. This note contains a pledge. Therefore this note is a
trust. However, the major premise is completely invalid. Every pledge is not a
trust. Circumstances may arise in the course
of any pledge situation in which some of
the attributes of a trust appear; particularly with reference to management or reduction to possession of collateral. This is
the type of situation which appears in the
cases cited by plaintiff. . . . A pledgee
who does not deal properly with property
of the pledgor in his possession may be
charged with fiduciary responsibility because
he has become a constructive trustee or a
trustee ex maleficio. However, this does
not mean, and cannot mean, that every pledgee
is a trustee of an express trust.
It is true, as plaintiff argues, ". . .
that the general property or title to the
property pledged remains in the pledgor
. . .," subject to the lien or rights of
the pledgee until the debt has been paid. . . .
But, this merely points up and emphasizes
the distinction of a pledge from the case
at bar. Here, when monthly payments were
made, the mortgagor divested himself of all
rights to the amount paid and relied directly
and solely upon the contractual obligation
of defendant to pay insurance and taxes. It
could be argued with greater force, and with
considerably more logic, that the language,
"If such sums are held in trust or carried
in a borrower's tax and insurance account . . . "
accentuates the absence of trust attributes
from the second option because it specifically
states the trust or first option as one
alternative and the borrower's accounts as
the second.
Fourth, even if the payments could be designated
"deposits" rather than "payments," a trust to hold the funds
in a special deposit was not created.

- 30 Fifth, the regulations of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board that a lender may require the monthly payments
"have the force and effect of law," and "this specific
regulation for advance payments by the borrower negates the
idea that such payments are deposits which are to be held as
a trust for the benefit of the debtor."
The case presented by plaintiffs to this Court is
so similar to the Zelickman and Sears cases that the same
result follows.

The deed of trust, like the note in Zelickman

and Sears, provides, at the option of defendant, (1) for the
pledge of the budget payments as additional security; (2)
withdrawal of the payments for payment of taxes and insurance; or (3) for application of the budget payments to sums
due under the deed of trust.

Unlike Sears, defendant here

is not obligated to pay the taxes and insurance; defendant
could simply hold the funds as additional security or could
apply them, as additional monthly payments, to the note.
Here, the deed of trust, unlike the note in Sears, makes no
reference to a trust where the monthly payments would be
maintained until payment of the taxes and insurance.
Both Sears and Zelickman expressly rejected plaintiffs1 general theorizing about the use of the word "pledge"
in this specific situation.
A deposit of money as security for the performance
of a contract creates only a debtor-creditor relationship

- 31 and is not a true pledge; Wilcox v. Gauntlett (Mich.), 166
N.W. 856; 72 C.J.S., Pledges §9, page 10.

"[A] pledge . . .

is the passing of the possession of a chattel by thereof to
the pledge . . .; Campbell v. Peter, 108 Utah 565, 167 P.2d
754 (1945).

None of the "pledge" cases cited in plaintiffs1

brief deal with this situation here; they all involve pledges
of chattels or stock.
Brooks v. Valley National Bank, supra, is the
second most recent case in point, and Carpenter v. Suffolk
Franklin Savings Bank (Mass. May, 1976), 346 N.E.2d 892
(Carpenter II), is the most recent.

Both traced prior

precedent, noting only three prior cases (including Carpenter I at 291 N.E.2d 609), which upheld borrowers1 claims on
a pleadings basis only.

Both noted the overwhelming major-

ity of cases denying borrower recovery as a matter of law
under any theory and followed the majority.

Both distin-

guished the three prior cases on grounds here applicable.
In

Brooks, the appellate court sustained summary

judgment for the lender, saying:
[A]11 jurisdictions which have considered
this problem, reaching either pro or con
conclusions, have relied primarily upon
the same underlying legal principles in
reaching their respective conclusions.
In our opinion, these agreed upon
principles are:
(1) That the presence or absence of words
such as "in trust", "trustee" or "beneficiary" do not necessarily manifest

- 32 an intent to create a trust relationship. (Citation omitted.)
(2)

Whether a trust is created depends upon
the intention of the parties to be
ascertained from their words, and
conduct in light of the surrounding
circumstances. (Citation omitted.)

(3)

A debt is not a trust.
2d., Trust §12.

(4)

In establishing a trust there must
be a res or specific property that
form the subject matters of the trust.
Sears v. First Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n., supra, Bogert, Trust and
Trustees, §111 (2nd Ed. 1964).

Restatement

. . .[T]he mortgage in this case provides:
" . . . the mortgagor, in order more
fully to protect the security of this
mortgage, covenants and agrees as
follows:
2. That, together with, and in
addition to, the monthly payments
of principal and interest payable
under the terms of this note secured
hereby the mortgagor will pay to the
mortgagee, on the 1st day of each
month until the said note is fully
paid, the following sums:
(a) [l/12th of the annual mortgage insurance premium required by
the National Housing Act, if the
note is secured under the provisions
of that act.]
(b) A sum equal to [1/12 of
hazard insurance premiums and taxes
due], such sums to be held by mortgagor in trust to pay said . . . premiums [and] taxes . . . .
(c) All payments mentioned in
the two preceding subsections of
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be made under the note secured
hereby shall be added together and
the aggregate amount thereof shall
be paid by the mortgagor each month
in a single payment to be applied
by mortgagee to the following item
in the order set forth:
(I) Premium charges under contract of insurance with the Federal
Housing Commissioner.
(ii) Ground rents, taxes, special assessments, fire and other
hazard insurance premiums [the impounds involved here],
(iii) Interest on the note secured
hereby; and
(IV) Amortization of the principal of said note."

Looking at the cold language of the document in question it appears that the intent
of the parties was that payment of impounds
was made "in order more fully to protect
the security of this mortgage." Consistent
with this intent is the provision that
failure to pay impounds will "constitute
an event of default under this mortgage,"
leading to foreclosure of the security.
It would appear that this right to foreclose
upon failure to pay impounds is more compatible
with a debtor-creditor relationship than with
a trustee-beneficiary relationship. The mortgage also provides that these impounds in
addition to being used for the payment of
taxes and insurance premiums can, under certain circumstances, be used to reduce the
principal indebtedness of the mortgagor.
Again, this provision is inconsistent with
the theory that a special res of the trust
was intended to be created for the purpose
of paying debts due third parties. Finally,
the mortgage document provides that a lump

- 34 aggregate sum is to be paid by the mortgagor
and the mortgagee is given authority to
allocate this single sum among various items
in a descending order of priority. Such
authorization is normally not afforded a
trustee, because the exercise of such authority
could theoretically, if the amount received
was insufficient to cover all items to which
payment is allocated, cause a foreclosure and
thus destruction of the res of the trust.
Admittedly, that portion of the payment
received by the mortgagee as impounds was
intended by the parties to be used primarily for a given purpose, that is, the
payment of taxes on the premises used as
security for the loan and the payment of
insurance premiums, insuring the premises.
Does this intent to use these funds for a
specific purpose create a trust relationship
between the parties?
The only language in the document
which could be construed as an intent to
create such a trust relationship is that
the mortgagee shall hold the impound "in
trust." However, when we consider the
conduct of the parties herein, as that
conduct can be construed to relate to their
intent, the mortgagee has specifically negated
such an intent by its affidavit in support
of the motion for summary judgment. On the
mortgagor's part, Brooks1 predecessor in
interest for a period of more than ten years,
acquiesced in the mortgagee using these
funds in a manner inconsistent with a
trust relationship.
Looking, then, to both the written
words and the conduct of the parties, we
find no factual dispute that the parties
did not intend the use of the words "in
trust" to create a trust relationship as to
impounds. Rather., we are of the opinion,
again from the language of the mortgage and
from the parties1 conduct, that the intent
of the parties was that the Bank became
contractually obligated to make the payment of taxes and insurance due on the

- 35 mortgaged premises to the extent that the
borrower made monies available to make such
payment. To express this intent, they
used the words "in trust." . . . This
did not create a trust relationship, but
merely a debtor-creditor relationship with
the creditor contractually bound to use a
portion of the funds received for a specific purpose. We so hold.

We turn now to Brooks' argument that
his complaint validly stated a cause of
action for "unjust enrichment". It is
generally held that unjust enrichment occurs
when one person has money which in justice
and equity belongs to another. 66 Am.Jur.2d
Restitution and Implied Contracts, §3, pg. 945.
Therefore, in order for Brooks to have stated
a valid cause of action against the Bank for
unjust enrichment it was incumbent upon him
to show that the impounds "belonged" to him.
Our previous discussion dealing with the
trust argument negates such an ownership
interest in the impounds. We have held that
the payment made by Brooks to the bank, including the amount for impounds, is in satisfaction of a debtor-creditor relationship
created by the mortgage document. In satisfaction of that relationship, Brooks retains
no more ownership in the funds paid as impounds
than he does in the principal and interest due
the Bank. What does "belong" to Brooks is a
cause of action against the Bank to require
it to perform its contractual obligation by
paying taxes and insurance to third parties
to the extent that Brooks has made funds
available for this purpose.
We therefore hold that payment of monthly
installments to the Bank, which installments
include monies for taxes and insurance are in
satisfaction of a debtor-creditor relationship
and upon receipt of these funds, title passes
to the Bank with the corresponding contractual
obligation to apply these funds in accordance
with that contract.
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point, the Court affirmed dismissal of the complaint after
trial on the merits.

The findings by the Court on trial

there are no different than the undisputed facts here before
the Court.

It held:

Nothing is said in the statutes or the
written agreements of the parties as to
interest on the payments or fruits of
the investment. The general understanding and practice in Massachusetts and
elsewhere over a period of some forty
years has been that the bank has the right
to treat the tax payments as its own.
We think that a mortgagor who claims that
he has made a different arrangement must
have a clear understanding to that effect.
See Restatement (Second) of Trusts §12,
comment e (1959); 4 A. Scott, The Law
of Trust §530 (3d Ed. 1967). No such
showing was made.
The judge ruled that neither the
nature of the transaction between the
plaintiffs and Suffolk Franklin nor
their relationship now calls for the
imposition of a resulting trust. We agree,
substantially for the same reasons that
we uphold his finding that there was no
express trust . . . .
. . . No doubt the contracts between
the plaintiffs and the bank were "adhesion"
contracts, but we are not prepared to hold
that they were unconscionable in the aspects here in issue. . . . Customers who
adhere to standardized contractual terms ordinarily "understand that they are assenting
to the terms not read or not understood, subject to such limitations as the law may
impose." See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §237, comment b (Tent. Drafts Nos.
1-7, 1973).
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been unjust in some sense. Apparently the
Legislature thought so when it enacted
G.L. c. 183, §61, inserted by St.1973,
c. 299, §1, effective July 1, 1975 [requires that, two years hence, interest be
paid on reserves "once a year and in a
manner to be determined by the mortgagee"].
But most of the unjust enrichment, if any,
enriched the bank's depositors at the time.
The plaintiffs do not suggest that those
depositors should now disgorge their excess
returns. Thus a judgment of restitution
would ultimately result in a transfer of
funds from present and future depositors
to compensate for excess payments to past
depositors. Doubtless for this reason the
Legislature enacted its reform with an
effective date over two years after enactment. We do not think we should go further
in disrupting legitimate expectations than
the Legislature was willing to go.
Moreover, the statutory reform requires
that interest be paid "at least once a year
at a rate and in a manner to be determined
by the mortgagee." We infer that the Legislature thought the amount of the banks' unjust enrichment would be very difficult to
measure by any objective standards. We are
not prepared to substitute our judgment on
this point for that of the Legislature. In
this aspect, this case is a good illustration of the advantages of legislative law
reform as compared with reform by judicial
decision. There was no such unjust enrichment, we hold, as to justify the imposition
of a constructive trust.
In Surrey Strathmore Corp. v. Dollar Savings Bank,
supra, the Court of Appeals of New York, in granting the
lender's motion to dismiss, said:
In the circumstances of the relationship between these parties it does not
advance our inquiry into the determination
of the rights of the mortgagor or of the
obligations of the mortgagee to proceed

- 38 in reliance on categorical concepts suggested by such labels as "trust", "agency",
"escrow", "debtor-creditor", for it must
be evident that the relationship here does
not fall essentially under any one of such
classical headings or any identifiable combination of them. Reasoning predicated on
such concepts would accordingly be untrustworthy. We cannot, for instance, ground any
conclusion on the use of the words "in trust"
in this particular mortgage clause. Resolution of the issues must depend rather on
what rights and obligations the parties are
found to have intended to create as manifested by the words they used in their
written agreement, with parol evidence
admissible to clarify ambiguities, if any,
under recognized canons of construction.
Preliminarily we note that the case
is before us on the Bank's motion to dismiss the petition for failure to state a
cause of action. Pursuant to the provisions of CPLR 3211(c) the parties submitted
affidavits and the courts below have in
effect treated the motion as a motion for
summary judgment. The affidavits submitted
by the parties raise no issues of fact or
credibility, anticipate the availability
of no additional extrinsic evidence, and
identify no factual inferences to be drawn
from extrinsic evidence. In this circumstance then there is no occasion for factfinding by a jury and the issue is to be
determined by the court as a matter of law.
(Citations omitted.)
We observe that the written expression
of the agreement of the parties contains no
explicit provision, one way or the other,
with respect to payment of interest or
earnings on the tax payments. The payment
of interest or earnings was not indispensible
to effectuate the. objectives of the mortgage
agreement and there is no other provision of
the written instrument from which it may be
inferred that the parties intended that
there be payment of interest or earnings.
Indeed, from the parties1 silence the inference may be drawn that no such payment
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interpreted against the party responsible
for its draftsmanship cannot be employed
conclusively to fill hiatuses in the instrument or to supply terms as to which the
parties themselves omitted to make any provision. There being no express agreement
of the parties and no predicate for any
inference that such an agreement was intended, we conclude that this mortgagor is
not entitled to the relief it now seeks.
To the extent that it might be argued
that the mere absence of an express provision that the mortgagor would not be entitled to any payments, in the context of
the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship,
creates an ambiguity as to the intention
of the parties, we turn to the relevant
parol evidence to resolve any such ambiquity. Here we have the undisputed proof
as to what was said when the agreement was
signed at the closing. [Plaintiff asked
at closing if interest would be paid on
reserves and was told "no.") That evidence
explicitly confirms the earlier inference
that no payment was intended. While it may
be said that only the word "interest" was
then used, in context we can only conclude
that this mortgagor intended, when the question was asked and answered, to inquire whether
the bank as mortgagee would make any return
payment, however characterized, with respect
to monies paid by the mortgagor into the tax
account. The answer was a categorical "no".

To the extent that as a matter of public policy restrictions should be placed on
the absolute freedom of either party to an
agreement of the sort here involved to
impose terms on the other, the issue is one
for legislative address.
Plaintiffs' theory of "special bank deposits"
(Point IV, appellants1 brief) is answered best by Durkee
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sustained summary judgment holding such reserve payments are
not special deposits and the mortgage is not required to
account for profits thereon.

It held that bank deposit

relationships, general or special, are contractual relationship arising from the delivery of money by the depositor to
the bank, but that in the case at bar, the contractual
relationship did not arise from the delivery of the first
monthly reserve payment, but arose from the mortgage document wherein the borrower promised to pay the monthly reserve to the bank, that the reserve payments did not constitute deposits in the legal sense of that term and, therefore, they could not be special deposits.

Of the cases

plaintiffs' brief cites in support of their proposition,
only Carpenter I, supra, is in point, and Durkee distinguishes Carpenter I on grounds here applicable, that in
Carpenter I the Court did not have before it the mortgage
document for construction.
The same reasoning which destroys plaintiffs1
"special deposit" theory also applies to and destroys plaintiff's "agency" theory (Point III, appellants1 brief).
Plaintiffs did not pay the reserves to defendant under
circumstances manifesting mutual intent that defendant would
hold or use the funds subject to plaintiffs' right of control.

Instead, plaintiffs paid the funds in performance of
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Plaintiff's agency theory is

wholly unsupported by any authority in this specific instance.
Only three cases give appellants any breath of
hope.

One is Carpenter I, supra, which Carpenter II,

supra, handles.

Brooks, supra, distinguished and declined

to follow Carpenter I, saying:
The Massachusetts appellate court
did not have before it the mortgage document
which it was alleged created the trust agreement and thus was limited to a determination
of whether, if true, the allegation of the
mortgagor's complaint stated a cause of
action.
The same distinction may be made of appellants1
second case, Buchanan v. Brentwood Fed. Svgs. & Loan Assn.
(Pa. 1974), 320 A.2d 117, where judgment dismissing the
complaint for failure to state a claim was reversed and the
case was remanded expressly to determine the language of the
mortgage:
Reversal . . . is required because
this court cannot say with assurance that
the trial court considered each mortgage
and bond agreement individually when it
concluded that appellant could not establish in any circumstance the existence of
a trust relationship.
Here, contrary to Carpenter I and Buchanan, the exact mortgage language is before the Court.
Buchanan and Carpenter are distinguishable because
both cases arose upon motion to dismiss complaints which did
not specifically allege the contract terms; the complaints
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payments and claimed such "created trust" or "unjustly enriched" the mortgagee and, hence, the appellate courts
remanded for appropriate findings.
Abrams v. Crocker Citizens National Bank (1974),
114 Cal.Rptr. 913f is the only other case found by us or
cited by plaintiffs that did not grant judgment in favor of
the mortgagee as a matter of law.
summary judgment.

That case arose upon

The appellate court noted the mortgage

required the bank to "hold such . . .payments in trust to
pay . . . premiums and taxes," and noted conflicting affidavits filed by the parties, the mortgagor saying he intended the reserves to be held in trust by the bank, and the
bank saying it did not so intend.

The Court held the inten-

tion of the parties was controlling and remanded for trial
because of
[A] factual conflict between appellant's
declaration that they expected and intended
the funds to be held in trust and respondent's
declaration that it never intended to create
a trust."
Here, the mortgage does not require the funds to be held in
trust.

Abrams is contrary to the other cases and is weak in

any event, for really, the unexpressed subjective intent of
the parties is not admissible.

Here, plaintiffs filed no

counter-affidavits as in Abrams.

No factual conflict here

exists, for plaintiffs have admitted they paid the monthly
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earnings would be paid thereon.

That admission and distinc-

tion brings us to our final point.
POINT IV
THE DOCTRINE OF PRACTIAL CONSTRUCTION SHOWS
THE PARTIES DID NOT INTEND THE CONTRACT
TO REQUIRE PAYMENT OF INTEREST OR EARNINGS
ON THE RESERVE;
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS HERE PROPER
The deed of trust here does not expressly require
defendant to pay interest nor to make an accounting of
earnings.

Plaintiffs claim such an obligation resulted from

an "implied term."

This Court has stated that "the doctrine

of practical construction may be applied only when the
contract is ambiguous"; Bullfrog Marinaf Inc. v. Lentz, 28
U.2d 261, 501 P.2d 266 (1972).
deed of trust —

There is no ambiguity in the

defendant is not required to pay interest

and is not required to account to plaintiffs concerning
plaintiffs1 budget payments; the great majority of cases
stated in Point III support defendant's position as a matter
of law.

Should the Court consider the minority view as

stated in only the Carpenter I, Buchanan and Abrams cases,
then parol evidence would become admissibly.
The only parol evidence here shows, without contradiction or conflict:
(1) Plaintiffs knew at the time they closed the
mortgage that defendant required budget payments and
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While plain-

tiffs thought this was unfair, they did not discuss the
subject at closing or request any change in the contract.
(2)

Plaintiffs have paid all budget payments for

11 years without expectation or request to receive any
earnings on the budget payments.
Under the doctrine of practical construction, a
contract may be interpreted consistent with the actions of
the parties.

Bullough v. Sims, 16 U.2d 304, 400 P.2d 20

(1965); Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1 U.2d 320, 266 P.2d
494 (1954), Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, (Utah 1975), 534 P.2d
85.

It is conclusively here shown that the parties did not

intend any contractual obligation requiring defendant to pay
interest or account for profits in connection with the
budget payments.
"In the interpretation of contracts, the interpretation given by the parties themselves as shown by their
acts will be adopted by the court"; Hardinge Co. v. Eimco
Corp., supra, 266 P.2d at 496.

See also 3 Corbin on Contracts,

§558 (1960) at page 249, et seq.
In Surrey Strathmore Corp. v. Dollar Savings Bank,
supra, the Court looked to the conversation between the
parties at time of closing to resolve any ambiguity.

The

mortgagor asked if interest would be paid on the reserves
and was told no.

The Court, in affirming summary judgment
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that evidence would require granting summary judgment.

In

Carpenter II and Brooks v. Valley National Bank, supra, the
Court held the same type of conduct by plaintiffs administered the coup de grace to their claims.

Plaintiffs here

did not ask at closing because they admittedly knew defendant would not pay interest or earnings on the reserves.
That knowledge equally confirms that no question of fact
here exists as to such parol evidence, and the case is,
therefore, ripe for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs here may not even claim the benefit of
conflicting parol evidence of intent of the parties, as in
Carpenter I, Buchanan.and Abrams.

Here, plaintiffs not only

moved for summary judgment themselves, they took the position before the trial court "that defendant is liable as a
matter of law to plaintiffs upon the written contract alleged in the Amended Complaint and that parol evidence is
inadmissible" (R.479).

They took that position in urging

their motion for summary judgment and in resisting defendant's motion.

They offered no evidence or affidavits what-

ever except the written trust agreement.

The reason plain-

tiffs must take such position is obvious; the parol evidence
of their conduct overwhelmingly shows the parties did not
intend defendant must account for earnings on the reserves.
That being so, even if the Court were inclined to follow the
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no different on trial,
CONCLUSION
On principle, on custom, on past practice between
the parties, on plaintiffs' admitted knowledge, on obvious
practical requirements of business, on the language of the
particular contract pleaded, and on any theory of implied
interest, trust or unjust enrichment, plaintiffs1 complaint
on this particular contract must fail, for upon the undisputed facts, plaintiffs may not recover as a matter of law
on this contract for the relief prayed for.

It is signi-

ficant that not one case has held a lender must pay interest
or earnings on mortgage reserves, while numerous cases have
summarily held he need not, in sound, logical, authoritative
decisions.
The Summary Judgment should be affirmed and defendant should be awarded its costs.
DATED this

day of September, 1976.
Respectfully submitted,
MOYLE & DRAPER

By
Joseph J. Palmer
Attorney for Defendant
600 Deseret Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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